Theory emphasizes the central role of the structure of networks in the behavior of financial systems and their response to policy. Real-world networks, however, are rarely directly observable: Banks' assets and liabilities are typically known, but not who is lending how much and to whom. We first show how to simulate realistic networks that are based on balance-sheet information by minimizing costs where there is a fixed cost to forming a link. Second, we also show how to do this for a model with fixed costs that are decreasing in the number of links. To approach the optimization problem, we develop a new algorithm based on the transportation planning literature. Computational experiments find that the resulting networks are not only consistent with the balance sheets, but also resemble real-world financial networks in their density (which is sparse but not minimally dense) and in their core-periphery and disassortative structure.
Introduction
It is well known that the structure of nancial networks is important in assessing systemic risk (Allen and Gale (2000) , Freixas et al. (2000) , Lux (2017) ). Network structure is also important in other areas of nance, such as market e ciency or payments processing (see Glassermann and Young (2015) for a review). In spite of its importance, the analysis of networks is made di cult by a lack of data for essential markets. For many crucial nancial networks, a researcher only has the assets and liabilities of individual agents in a nancial network. e bilateral arrangements betwen individuals are missing.
One strategy for dealing with the lack of network data is to back out a network structure from balance-sheet information and banks' optimizing decisions. Unfortunately, this is complicated by the lack of appropriate numerical tools. Network problems are complex. For example, consider the decision surrounding interbank loans where the links between nodes are whether to lend to a speci c bank and how much to lend. is problem must consider many possibilities that are both discrete (the decision to open a costly link and make a loan between two particular banks) and continuous (the amount of lending through this link). If a network has more than 20 nodes, a numerical solution to a mixed continuous-discrete problem is well-known to be very hard to solve exactly, and with more than 100 nodes, it is hard to nd even an approximate solution tp yhr problem.
In this paper, we propose a set of heuristics for constrained network formation that are adapted from a rich literature in the analysis of transportation costs. We suitably modify these heuristics so that they can t or simulate nancial networks with characteristics that we observe in the real world. Our application incorporates cost measures that could be estimated structurally in our fairly simple framework.
We start from a basic xed-cost of a link that is consistent with the observation that interbank activity is based on relationships (Cocco et al. (2009) ). Establishing and maintening a lending-borrowing relationship (that is, a link) is expensive. e monitoring costs associated with this link are paid by both borrower and lender, although usually the lender pays more up-front. Our model assigns to each bank a xed cost that is independent of contract size but decreases for every additional link formed by a bank. e interpretation of this is that as a bank develops risk controls within its institution, these controls are subject to increasing returns to scale. is is also consistent with the observation of Cocco et al. (2009) and others that banks with large reserve imbalances typically engage in many relationships. It is in line with the idea that banks with more links will diversify their large portfolios. In other words, additional links are expensive due to information processing, risk management, and credit-worthiness checks, but such costs decrease as the bank establishes more links and its infrastructure grows. Establishing more links promotes further diversi cation, and is helpful where it might not be possible to nd a single counterparty to satisfy all their liquidity or borrowing needs. Moreover, our model allows us to distinguish costs that are borne by the lender, or the borrower, or split between the two parties. e model determines the optimal network con guration, where optimality is de ned with respect to a single parameter geometrically decreasing xed cost. e optimization problem is NP-hard and the search space has frictions and multiple local and global optima. To solve it, borrowing from transportation theory, we introduce the North-West-Corner-Rule (NWCR) and one variation, relying on simulated annealing, which allows reliable solutions to be found within reasonable time and does not require function approximation by Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo as in Anand et al. (2015) .
Our numerical experiments show that the proposed approach reproduces several stylized facts of interbank networks: sparsity, core-periphery and disassortative structures. By starting from a realistic marginal distribution of assets and liabilities, the core-periphery of Craig and von Peter (2014) emerges as a natural property of the system, and the distribution of contract sizes exhibits a smaller right tail. is indicates the less extreme lender-borrower relationships that we generally observe. Due to its simplicity, we can further explore what happens when the borrowers or the lenders pay the cost of a link, and we consider a shared-cost version. e problem of reconstructing a network that satis es a given set of assets and liabilities of the individual banks has prompted a stream of research (see Squartini et al. (2018) Gao et al. (2018) , Hueser (2015) for reviews on these methods applied to nancial networks). Upper and Worm (2004) suggested employing maximum entropy methods as they are easy to compute. Howeve,r maximum entropy, while satisfying the balance-sheet constraint, does not replicate characteristics such as sparsity and a core-periphery structure that are observed in networks where more complete data are avaiable. In such a structure, core members are strongly connected to each other, whereas periphery members establish just a few links with core members but none with other periphery members (Borga i and Evere (2000)). Alternative methods based on copulas, bootstrap, and iterative algorithms have been subsequently developed and compared. Among these alternatives, Anand et al. (2018) consider 25 di erent nancial markets spread out among 13 regulatory jurisdictions for which the complete network data are available. e xed-cost model developed by Anand et al. (2015) tends to simulate networks that outperform all other simulations with respect to the Hamming distance and accuracy score between the simulated and actual networks.
is model constructed a sparse network that managed to avoid the inclusion of links that are not present in the actual network. e simulations very rarely exhibited a core-periphery structure, and used an algorithm that performed slowly, o en converging to a local optimum (see Figure 1 in Anand et al. (2015) ).
Where bilateral data exist, a few works so far have focused on di erent nancial markets. ese include Borga i and Evere (2000) for the Austrian interbank market; Li et al. (2018) for the Chinese loan network with core-periphery structure, Silva et al. (2016) for the Brazilian core-periphery market structure; Finger et al. (2013) for the e-MID overnight money market; Iori et al. (2015) , Temizsoy et al. (2015) for the e-MID Interbank market; and Van Lelyveld and In'T Veld (2014) for the core-periphery structure in the Netherlands. ese empirical investigations establish a few stylized facts of interbank lending, such as a typical core-periphery structure, network sparsity, and disassortativeness. e agent-based modeling literature has focused on replicating some of these characteristics, as in the work of Gurgone et al. (2018) and Liu et al. (2018) and within dynamic modeling frameworks, as in Zhang et al. (2018) , Guleva et al. (2017) , Xu et al. (2016) , and Capponi and Chen (2015) . Lux (2015) introduces a simple dynamic agent-based model that, starting from a heterogeneous bank size distribution and relying on a reinforcement learning algorithm based on trust, allows the system to naturally evolve toward a core-periphery structure where core banks assume the role of mediators between the liquidity needs of many smaller banks. Blasques et al. (2018) propose a dynamic network model of interbank lending for the Dutch interbank market, pointing out that credit-risk uncertainty and peer monitoring are driving factors for the sparse core-periphery structure. e paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces state-of-the-art methods and our proposed model with decreasing marginal xed costs. Section 3 focuses on the optimization model and introduces the new NWCR obtained by combining heuristics, such as simulated annealing, with the classical NWCR from transportation theory. Section 4 describes the properties of networks under decreasing marginal xed costs. Finally, Section 5 draws the main conclusions and the outlook for further research.
2 Reconstructing Networks 2.1 Existing Methods e problem of reconstructing banking networks based on limited information has a racted some a ention in the literature, in particular for the case where, for banks, their (total) assets, , and liabilities, , with , = 1, … , are known, but not who is lending to whom, let alone the exact amounts, . All we do know is that the volumes are not negative and that budget constraints must hold; and if the banks' identities are known (and indices and correspond), self-lending might be excluded:
e basic problem in this situation is that there are (potentially: in nitely) many networks ℤ = [ ] that meet these criteria. Network reconstruction methods can therefore not assume that there is a unique solution but require additional assumptions. ese can simplify or exacerbate the computational requirements, and they o en lead to di erent network properties more or less close to stylized facts for real networks. 1 A popular group of such reconstruction methods is based on the maximum entropy (ME) principle. In simple terms, the idea is to create a fully connected network (with or without the constraint = 0) where the contract size between lender and borrower is proportional to the size of and relative to their market shares. Initiated by Upper and Worm (2004) , this method is simple and fast, but by construction misses some stylized facts of real-world networks. Among other things, real banking networks are far from fully connected, but tend to have a low density. Also, a lender to two borrowers could easily have the larger exposure to the smaller of the two, a portfolio of a real-world lender twice the size of another lender is not twice 's portfolio. Subsequent methods try to incorporate this: Drehmann and Tarashev (2013) , for example, suggest re-scaling ME networks based on stochastic principles while retaining 100 percent density.
Other approaches explicitly control for the density: Cimini et al. (2015) , e.g., incorporate a density parameter in their tness model, while Musmeci et al. (2013) combine the density-driven link selection with ME. Hałaj and Kok (2013) , on the other hand, suggest an iterative sampling technique that starts with an empty network, (0) , and where in each iteration, , a random pair ( , ) of a lender and a borrower is drawn and their contract size is increased according to ( ) = ( −1) + min ( −1) , ⋅ ( −1) , where is a uniform random number and ( −1) and ( −1) are not yet allocated assets and liabilities, respectively. is is repeated until all assets and liabilities are assigned. e resulting network typically exhibits low density, but not, e.g., a core-periphery structure. Anand et al. (2015) consider sparsity as an explicit objective: links are costly and banks therefore have an inherent motive to keep the number of links as low as possible. ey argue that any active link causes xed costs irrespective of the actual contract size. If the variable costs, proportional to contract size, are the same between all parties (e.g., the interbank o ered rate), it should not a ect the choice (and number) of partners (and, from an optimization perspective, can be neglected); additional or avoidable xed costs, however, should, and keeping the number of links at a minimum is advantageous. Reconstructing a network can therefore be considered a minimization problem for the overall cost of the network, (ℤ):
where
under budget and non-negativity constraints (1). is the constant xed costs per link, and 1 is a binary indicator as to whether or not bank lends to bank . is is equivalent to nding the network with the lowest average degree, i.e., the lowest number of edges, under given constraints.
Since this is a directed network with edges (links) running from lenders (assets) to borrowers (liabilities), the out-degree, , of bank is the number of banks is lending to, while 's in-degree, , is the number of banks is borrowing from:
e cost function can be rewri en as a function of the banks' (and, ultimately, the network's) degrees-from the lenders' perspective as
or, from the borrowers' perspective as
or, if costs are incurred by either side and = + = ⋅ + ⋅ (1 − ) with 0 ≤ ≤ 1, then
(3**) e total number of links in the minimum density (MD) network ℤ is ∑ , 1 = ∑ = ∑ and can be considered the lower bound for the actual number of links in the real (unobserved) network behind the s and s.
From an optimization point of view, is just a scalar, and solving optimization problem (2) produces a minimum density network with the lowest possible degree. Anand et al. (2018) nd that networks constructed using such methods compare favorably with those using other popular methods along many dimensions. Nonetheless, there are still aspects that can be improved. For one, real-world networks are usually less sparse than the MD solution, and MD networks do not have a pronounced core-periphery structure. Also, it might be a strong assumption that any link causes the same xed costs. We suggest an extended model to remedy these issues.
A Model with Decreasing Marginal Fixed Costs
If the xed costs of a link are caused by establishing and maintaining a link between two banks, then it seems reasonable to assume a learning curve: an already well-connected bank can draw from experience and can spread its overhead over more contracts, and any additional link will incur lower costs than the previous (or rst) one. Assuming that there is a geometric decay in the additional xed costs depending on the bank's already existing links and re ected by a factor with 0 ≤ ≤ 1, then the rst link will come with costs of , the second with ⋅ , the third with ⋅ 2 and so on until the last with ⋅ −1 where is this bank's degree, i.e., its number of links. In total, this bank's costs add up to
Assume that, akin to (3*), all costs are from the lenders' perspective so that the new cost function now reads * (ℤ) = ⋅ ∑ =1 ( , ) .
In this extended model, the costs of the network still depend on the degree, but no longer in a linear fashion when the marginal costs are shrinking, < 1. If there is no decay in xed costs, = 1, then this model is identical to the minimum density (MD) model. In the MD model, it makes no di erence whether costs are incurred by lenders, borrowers, or both, and the solution for cost function (3**) is not a ected by the choice of . When marginal costs are decreasing, however, things are di erent: lenders and borrowers can have di erent (distributions of) degrees, and they might face di erent learning curves with separate and . e new optimization model with decreasing marginal xed costs can then be summarized as follows:
with banks' cost function (5) and with constraints (1) on budget, non-negative volumes, and, where applicable, self-lending. e parameter controls who incurs the costs: for = 1, it is exclusively the lenders, for = 0, it is the borrowers, and for values between these extremes, it is a combination.
3 Finding Cost-Optimized Networks
e Underlying Optimization Problem
Both the minimum density and the decreasing marginal xed-cost models present challenging optimization problems: there are no closed-form analytical solutions, and numerically they are hard to tackle. ey are discrete and non-convex with local optima, rendering hill-climbing methods unreliable. Non-deterministic methods might be suitable to overcome those local optima. For example, Anand et al. (2015) employ a Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) approach and nd sparse solutions to their test problems. However, a closer look reveals that convergence is rather slow, and that even for their small test problem with just six lenders and ve borrowers, their reported solution turns out to be suboptimal. Interestingly, they also point out that their problem is equivalent to the Fixed-Cost Transportation Problem (FCTP), a popular archetypal problem in logistics. ere, the situation is that suppliers = 1, … , can produce goods that are sold in outlets = 1, … , . e assignment problem then is to nd the quantities that are shipped from producers to outlets such that the outlets' demands are met (∑ = ) without exceeding the suppliers' capacities (∑ ≤ ) while minimizing the overall costs, ∑ ∑ ⋅ +∑ ∑ 1 ⋅ , where are proportional costs per unit of goods (e.g., costs per truck transporting one unit of goods over the distance between and ) and is the xed costs for this active link (e.g., the set-up costs for the cooperation between and ).
antities must not be negative ( ≥ 0), and 1 = 1 indicates an active link (if > 0; 1 = 0 otherwise). For the special case of ∑ = ∑ , the problem is also known as Balanced FCTP.
In the banking network problem, the lenders correspond to the suppliers, the borrowers to the outlets, and contract sizes to the shipped quantities. could be seen as the interest rate; if this is the same for all combinations ( = ∀( , ), e.g., in the absence of risk premia, time spreads, etc.), the variable part of the cost function can be dropped as it always adds up to the same value, leaving only the part with the xed costs to be relevant. And it is exactly this part that makes it a challenging optimization problem; then for a relatively small number of producers and outlets (or, here, banks), optimal solutions cannot be found in a reasonable time frame. In a market with banks, there are up to 2 potential links each of which could be active or inactive; this amounts to as many as 2 2 combinations even before considering how to distribute the quantities. With the constraint = 0 active (a situation hardly relevant in the traditional FCTP), these numbers are lowered to ( − 1) = 2 − and 2 2 − , respectively; either way, the search space is vast, even for very small markets: for example, for just = 10 banks, there would be 2 100 > 1.26 +30 and 2 90 > 1.23 +27 alternatives, respectively, just for se ing the links, and before assigning actual quantities .
is is why a number of initialization methods have been developed that create solutions that are at least feasible and valid with respect to the constraints.
One such method is the North-West-Corner-Rule (NWCR; see, e.g., Hillier and Liebermann (2010)) for which we suggest a modi cation to approach our cost-minimization problem for network reconstruction.
3.2
e Modi ed North-West-Corner-Rule e original North-West-Corner-Rule uses a tableau where the rows are the suppliers (here: lenders) and the columns are the outlets (here: borrowers) and where quantities are iteratively assigned. Using the notation from our problem, it is initialized by considering all assets and liabilities to be unassigned ( (0) = , (0) = ) and all links to be inactive ( = 0). en it follows an iterative procedure where in each iteration, , one pair of a lender and a borrower is selected. In the rst iteration, it is the combination of the top-le corner ("north-west" corner, hence the name) of the tableau with ( = 1, = 1). Next, one checks how much of 's supply is still unassigned, and how much open demand has le . e lower of the two is the maximum contract size between the two and chosen for , while 's available supply and 's open demands are lowered accordingly: = min ( ) , ( ) , ( ) = ( −1) − , and ( ) = ( −1) − . If 's assets are now exhausted ( ( ) = 0), one moves on to the next supplier ( ∶= + 1; move south in the tableau); if has no further demand for liabilities ( ( ) = 0), one moves to the next borrower ( ∶= + 1; move east in the tableau). is nishes iteration and starts iteration + 1. ese iteration steps are then repeated until no available assets and no demand for liabilities are le , and the south-east corner has been reached. e network ℤ in Table 1 (b) has been created in exactly that fashion. 2 e NWCR does produce a feasible solution as it is based on the constraints. However, it does not guarantee an optimal solution for two reasons: (a) costs, xed and variable alike, are ignored in the creation process, and (b) the sequence in which the banks are listed drives the assignments. At the same time, it tends to produce very sparse networks, which, here, works to our advantage as it keeps the aggregate xed costs low. e second aspect concerning the sequence is usually considered a downside, as the sorting and the resulting pairs ( , ) are o en arbitrary. For the problem at hand, we suggest turning this into a crucial feature of the optimization: we use it to our advantage and restate the search process as nding a permutation of the lenders and borrowers such that the resulting network from the NWCR has minimum costs. is turns the optimization problem into a traveling salesman problem (TSP)-which is NP hard (i.e., with no known algorithm where the required computation time is no worse than polynomial in the number of instances), but for which non-deterministic search methods have been found to have favorable convergence properties. For the problem at hand, we adopt a Simulated Annealing algorithm, originally suggested by Kirkpatrick et al. (1983) , and t it to our problem: starting with a random solution, each iteration produces one new solution (here: a slightly varied permutation of lenders and borrowers) by mutating the current one. In the case of the TSP, that can be done by randomly switching two or more randomly chosen elements (e.g, aBcdEf becomes aEcdBf), or by randomly choosing a segment of the sequence and reversing its order (e.g., abCDEf becomes abEDCf). If the mutant solution is be er than the current one, it replaces it; but a worse solution can also be accepted, with a certain probability, to overcome local optima: the larger the downhill step (and the longer the search process has been going on), the lower that probability. A er its nal iteration, the algorithm reports the best of all tested candidates. B provides pseudo-algorithms for the Simulated Annealing algorithm and the modi ed North-West Corner Rule.
Mimicking the real-world crystallization and annealing process, a "temperature" parameter gears the search process: if the temperature is too generous (high), any mutant is accepted and the search turns into a random walk; if it is converging to zero (i.e., even the slightest deterioration is unlikely to be accepted), then it turns into a hill-climber. With a well-chosen temperature and cooling plan, however, the process creates a trajectory through the search domain that can overcome local optima (thanks to accepting some of the downhill steps), but with a tendency to converge to the optimum (thanks to ignoring very damaging steps, but with a dominating preference for uphill steps). Typically, the temperature parameter is therefore calibrated with a reasonably generous value in the beginning, but gradually lowered toward zero, to shi the search process from an explorative to an exploitative behavior. 3
Properties of Networks under Decreasing Marginal
Fixed Costs
A Simple Illustrative Example
Assume there are six banks that are all lenders with assets [ ] = [50, 15, 12, 11, 8, 4] and another six banks that are all borrowers with [ ] = [51, 14, 13, 10, 9, 3] . No bank is both lender and borrower; the self-lending constraint can be ignored. Banks are sorted by size in descending order to facilitate interpretation. Table 1 shows three di erent networks, all of which satisfy the budget and non-negativity constraints and produce the required assets and liabilities. e scalar is assumed to be 1 here and in all subsequent experiments. e network ℤ in Subtable 1(a) has been created with the maximum entropy (ME) approach. Note that all columns (portfolios of borrowers) are proportional to each other, re ecting the relative size of the banks' liabilities; the same is true for all rows (portfolios of lenders): bank E is twice the size of F, = 2⋅ ∀ = 1, … , . By construction, this is a fully connected network with 36 (out of a possible 36) active links, resulting in a density of 100 percent, and where each lender is linked to any borrower and vice versa. Any bank, lender and borrower, therefore, has a degree of 6. With xed constant costs of 1 per link, this adds up to total network costs of 36. If costs are incurred by lenders and their decay factor is = 0.7, the marginal costs for additional links go down, and each lender's costs are reduced from 36 to 2.94, causing overall network costs of 17.65 (imprecision due to rounding).
Network ℤ in Subtable 1(b) is one possible solution when the network is being reconstructed under minimum density (MD). 4 Any bank with positive assets needs to have at least one link. If there is another bank with liabilities = , then both can do with just this one link, otherwise, either or needs at least one additional link, depending on whose position is larger. In this example, (at least) three of these additional links are required. It can be seen that a density Table 1 : Reconstructed networks for a simple example with six lenders (A-F) and six borrowers (K-P), respectively.
is the (out-) degree of lender , are 's total costs, depending on decay factor . Costs are incurred by lenders only ( = 1). of 25 percent (9 active out of 36 possible links) su ces to generate a valid solution.
In this particular solution, lenders can do with just one or at most two links, reducing their respective costs to 1 and 2 when there are constant xed costs, adding up to overall costs of 9, which is optimal under constant xed costs: for this market, there exists no solution with fewer than nine links. When additional xed costs decrease with = 0.7, the lender's costs are 1 (when = 1) and 1+0.7 = 1.7 (when = 2), respectively. In this case, the overall costs for the MD network are now just 8.1-which is no longer optimal: under decreasing marginal xed costs, there exist solutions that have more links, yet lower overall costs, thanks to exploiting reductions in the additional xed costs. Simply speaking, if there is a need for one extra link, it is cheaper to have it not as a second link, but to ride the learning curve and have this extra link with a lender who already has several links. In fact, one second link (additional costs: 0.7) can be more expensive than a fourth and h link combined (0.7 3 + 0.7 4 = 0.58). Hence, a slightly higher density is not necessarily more expensive if links are well chosen. e optimal network under decreasing marginal xed costs (DC) ℤ in Subtable 1(c) exhibits exactly that. It has a total of 11 links, but they are more unevenly distributed among the lenders: while most have just one link, the rst (and largest) lender has six. With = 0.7, this lender's rst contract comes with unit cost, the second one costs 0.7, the third just 0.49 and so on, down to less than 0.17 for the sixth. ese ve extra links cost a total of 1.94. In ℤ , on the other hand, there were three lenders (B, C, and F) who all had one extra link; each of these cost them 0.7, totaling 2.1 and exceeding A's ve additional links. In other words, the lenders now have out-degrees either at the bare minimum with just one link, or they are the provider(s) of as many of the required extra links as possible. Overall, parsimonious networks are still highly desirable; however, concentration can make additional links acceptable. e consequences of decreasing marginal xed costs manifest themselves in the distribution of the lenders' degrees. Revisiting the ME network, the Her ndahl index, , and, for easier comparison, its normalized version, * , for the outdegrees are
which shows perfect evenness. For the MD network, = 0.185 ( * = 0.02), indicating that the out-degrees are still quite even. For the DC network, however, = 0.339 ( * = 0.21), highlighting the strong unevenness in the lenders' number of links.
Another way of looking at ℤ is that there are many banks (both lenders and borrowers) with few links (and, in particular, no links between them) , and one bank on either side with many links (with links between these two and all the other ones). is is typical for core-periphery networks where a small group of banks (core) has many links to any other banks, while the large group of all other banks (periphery) is typically linked to some of the cores, but with hardly any links to other periphery banks.
Note that < 1 will lower the average costs per contract: a lender with just one link faces costs of 1.0; the lender with 6 links, on the other hand, faces average costs of just 2.94/6 = 0.49. If lenders pass their costs on to the borrowers, then a core lender can o er more a ractive conditions than one from the periphery. However, in this model, we only consider where the costs originate and not how they are redistributed within the system, and we are refraining from additional interpretations of this aspect.
In short, ℤ found under the decreasing marginal xed costs is quite sparse, but not at its absolute minimum, and it resembles a core-periphery structure. To test whether this is a typical outcome, we performed a large-scale computational experiment with arti cial data, described in the following sections.
Experimental Setup for Arti cial Markets and Preliminary Tests
For the computational experiments, numerous arti cial markets were generated. e main experiments reported in this paper are based on 100 markets, each consisting of = 100 banks where assets and liabilities follow a log-normal distribution. Also, it is assumed that the largest lender is the largest borrower, implying that self-links can be identi ed when = and the constraint = 0 is enforced. e parameter for shi ing the costs between assets and liabilities was chosen from ∈ {1, 0.5, 0}; the decay factors were selected from , ∈ {0.5, 0.55, ..., 0.85, 0.90, 0.925, 0.95, 0.975, 1.0}, including the combinations when both sides incur costs (i.e., = 0.5).
In addition, markets with ∈ {25, 50, 100, 200} banks have been simulated, where assets and liabilities were drawn from parametric distributions such as the log-normal, Pareto, chi-squared, and uniform, and also by bootstrapping from anonymized empirical data. We found that the main ndings can be observed in all of these markets, yet to various degrees: reactions to changes in the decay parameter(s) were more abrupt in smaller, and smoother in larger, markets, but with the la er requiring substantial CPU time in the optimization process and, perhaps, leaving more room for convergence. Similar variations could be found when the distributions of assets and liabilities were more or less skewed.
Stochastic optimization methods are not guaranteed to nd the global optimum, but they have an increased chance of nding the optimum or a solution close to it when granting more iterations and when allowing for restarts and reporting only the best of repeated a empts. is is why all problems for the main experiments have undergone numerous (typically hundreds of) restarts with random initial solutions, but also with initial solutions that were found to be optimal in previous runs (and with the renewed threshold sequence allowing for more than just a re ned local search) as well as optimal solutions for similar problems (identical market, but di erent se ings of , , and ).
Also, it should be noted that the suggested procedure of creating a network by searching a permutation of banks and mapping it via the NWCR into a network does not guarantee that the reported result is the global optimum. Numerous preliminary experiments, however, suggest that it is more e cient than other methods in the sense that it nds solutions that are at least as good, but in substantially less time, in particular for larger problems. It can therefore be assumed that the reported results typically are close enough to the actual optima to re ect important properties. Nonetheless, results will be interpreted cautiously, also because in these problems, global optima are not necessarily unique, and even while they share the same minimum costs, their other characteristics might di er.
All implementations were done in Matlab version 2018b.
Findings for Arti cial Markets
e toy example in Table 1 illustrated that overall costs are lower when xed costs for links are subject to decay: taking the minimum density solution already lowers costs whenever there are banks that require more than one link. ey bene t from the reduced costs, and it might be bene cial to have more links with a highly connected bank than two links with a bank that has only a few connections. is means that, on a macro level, the overall number of links and the density of the network will go up. On a micro level, poorly connected banks will have even fewer links (perhaps just one) and become (even more) peripheral, while the highly connected ones (typically also those with large balance sheets) will have even more links. ese e ects are con rmed by the experiments with the 100 arti cial markets with = 100 banks each. Figure 1 looks at the overall e ects when costs are incurred by the lenders ( = 1). As can be seen from Sub gure 1(a), the stronger the decay in marginal xed costs (i.e., the lower ), the lower the overall cost of the network; this is particularly noticeable when compared to the minimum density network (i.e., when = 1). Note that, for lower , the costs converge to 100: the market consists of = 100 banks, and every bank needs to have at least one link. e rst link has unit costs of = 1, while the additional ones will be (substantially) cheaper; their contribution to the overall network costs become less noticeable. By construction, every bank has a positive budget and therefore requires at least one link. At the same time, optimal networks tend to have overall more links, which is equivalent to a higher density; cf. panel 1(b). Larger markets allow a more subtle analysis of the results. Panel 1(c) shows that lenders di er more in how many links they have (i.e., the lenders' out-degree), but for the same reason as in the small example: larger banks with many links already in place are the preferred partners for borrowers' additional (or even rst) links, as this lowers the additional costs. Borrowers' numbers of links are also slightly more uneven, but the e ect is much less pronounced than on the lenders' side (or in the toy example where alternatives were very limited). With more overall links now in the networks, borrowers now get their liabilities from either a single or two (or, occasionally, more) lenders. In particular, these additional lenders tend to be large ones with many outlinks. Note that very strong decay might so en that e ect somewhat: when is (very) low and the number of links is already high, the marginal xed costs will be virtually negligible, as will be the marginal decrease in the absolute (dollar) values. Hence, the second most connected lender is e ectively as favorable as the lender with the highest degree, and lenders with slightly lower assets can also gain core status. is is underlined by two additional statistics: comparing the active links and the rank (with respect to size) of the lender and borrower involved, it is generally true that larger lenders cooperate with smaller borrowers and vice versa. e larger the decay in marginal xed costs, the more obvious this pa ern becomes, and the negative rank correlations become substantially more pronounced; see panel 1(e). At the same time, more banks can be considered core (panel 1(f)).
When costs are entirely incurred by borrowers, = 0, then sides are swapped, and they encounter all the e ects just seen for lenders, and vice versa.
When both sides contribute to the network costs, with = 0.5, and xed costs for a lender's and a borrower's rst link on either side are = (1 − ) = 1 2 , respectively, e ects are mixed, largely in uenced by the respective decay factors. Figure 2 summarizes the main results. Figure 3 provides the adjacency matrices and network structures for one of the sample markets. Lenders are along the vertical axis (sorted by size; largest on top), borrowers along the horizontal axis (also sorted by size, largest on the le ). A dot indicates an existing link ( > 0, 1 = 1). e top le network is for the minimum density case; top right and bo om le are for the case where costs decay with a factor of = = 0.7 and are incurred by lenders ( = 1) and borrowers ( = 0) only, respectively; bo om right is the case where both incur costs ( = 0.5). A core-periphery structure emerges in particular in the last of these cases: large banks (low indices) tend to be highly linked (albeit not among themselves, which here is a side-e ect of the NWCR assignment rule), while small banks have few links, which are mostly to large banks. 
Conclusion
is paper introduces a model with decreasing marginal xed costs in order to recreate banking networks with realistic characteristics. We argue that establishing a link between a borrower and a lender is costly, yet with decreasing marginal costs: banks face a learning curve, and the process for se ing up an additional link is cheaper than establishing the rst link. is makes large banks a ractive partners. A large lender has the assets to be the sole partner for many small borrowers, both as borrower and as lender. e larger partner therefore is welllinked and bene ts from the learning curve. e model is stated as an optimization problem for the social planner, which turns out to be numerically challenging. To approach this problem, we introduce a new algorithm.
Numerical experiments for arti cial markets show that the resulting networks exhibit some typical stylized facts observed in real-world banking networks: they are quite, but not too, sparse with densities similar to those observed in real-world networks. A core-periphery structure emerges where a few banks constitute the core (the large ones) and are connected to many other banks, while periphery banks have very few links, which are mostly to core banks. Our algorithm has many potential applications that can be extended to agent-based modeling and empirical structural estimation. e fact that our focus has been on a cost structure facing the system assists in this extension, with some important caveats.
First, the cost structure is aggregated so that it is unclear whether the algorithm can be used to solve problems where the banks or agents are individually optimizing over their cost structure. Work needs to be done on our model where the social planner's problem is related to that of the equilibrium achieved by the optimizing behavior of the separate agents. Second, while the costs of a link are important, they are not the only costs associated with nancial networks. Future research will extend our model and algorithm to incorporate aspects such as diversi cation, explicit limits on contract sizes (e.g., to re ect regulatory requirements), di erent interest rates, and dynamic aspects such as multiperiod network formation and adaptation.
A Multiple Global Optima
Both under the minimum density model and the decreasing marginal xed-costs model, solutions are not unique. Typically, there exist several or even many solutions all of which exhibit the same (globally optimal) network costs and distribution of lenders' and borrowers' degree, yet have di erent adjacency matrices. Building on the small illustrative example in Section 4.1, Table 1 illustrates this for the minimum density model, and Table 2 for the minimum cost model. It is important to note that descriptive statistics for the network structure (and adjacency matrix) can therefore vary. 50, 15, 12, 11, 8, 4] and [ ] = [51, 14, 13, 10, 9, 3] ; more exist. All have a degree of 9, i.e., a density of 9 36 = 25%. return ℤ
